



Upjohn Institute Press 
 
 
Problems in Occupational 
















Chapter 13 (pp. 323-326) in: 
Current Issues in Workers' Compensation 
James Chelius, ed. 





Copyright ©1986. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. All rights reserved. 
13
Problems in Occupational 
Disease Compensation
Leslie I. Boden
School of Public Health
Boston University
The papers presented in this section cover an important set 
of issues in workers' compensation for occupational 
diseases. First, we are presented with data indicating that the 
current state systems have serious problems compensating 
victims of asbestos-related diseases and, by inference, other 
occupational diseases which are even less well understood. 
Then, we are given proposals for solving the problems of 
compensating occupational diseases, solutions proposed to 
be implemented at the federal level.
Spatz's paper presents a "best case" picture of occupa 
tional disease compensation in the United States. He chooses 
a state system with no artificial barriers to compensation; the 
most well-known occupational disease agent; and workers 
who had been under study and were therefore likely to be 
more aware of the occupational origin of their diseases. In 
spite of these favorable conditions, Spatz documents serious 
problems faced by survivors of insulation workers who died 
from asbestos-related diseases. The issues are familiar ones, 
echoing those discussed by Earth and Hunt, 1 and by Earth2 
in his recent study of asbestos insulation workers. In Spatz's
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study, workers' compensation claims for asbestos-related 
disease were generally controverted, resulting in long delays, 
high legal expenses, and uncertain outcomes. Most claimants 
were not paid the full dependency amount, but received a 
smaller award, a settlement, or no award at all. Survivors of 
insulators waited a median period of 19 months to have their 
claims resolved.
Spatz concludes that "our current system of workers' 
compensation has been inadequate" in its handling of oc 
cupational disease. He and Elisburg provide suggestions for 
altering state workers' compensation systems which, in their 
views, will improve the compensation of occupational 
disease victims and their survivors.
These comments will focus on one aspect of occupational 
disease compensation, the uncertainty that leads to many of 
the problems presented in Spatz's paper. Before that, I 
would like to list some basic criteria by which the adequacy 
of occupational disease compensation can be judged.
Criteria for Judging Occupational 
Disease Compensation Systems
Elisburg presents some of the basic goals of workers' com 
pensation: (1) complete coverage of injuries and illnesses 
arising out of and in the course of employment, (2) prompt 
delivery of benefits, (3) a "reasonable" level of benefits, in 
cluding full payment for medical benefits and rehabilitation. 
I would like to add to this list: (4) efficient delivery of 
benefits, i.e., a low expense-to-benefit ratio, and (5) certain 
ty about what injuries and illness are covered. In addition, 
one could suggest: (6) minimal compensation for injuries 
and illnesses that are not work-related.
Spatz's work suggests that the first five goals have not 
been met for asbestos-caused deaths. Survivors often do not 
apply. When they do apply, their claims are often con-
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troverted. Settlements are partial, decisions are apparently 
capricious, substantial legal costs are incurred, and awards 
are delayed for many months. These problems lead quite 
naturally into a discussion of reforms designed to improve 
compensation for occupational diseases. While Spatz does 
not address the sixth goal, the history of the federal Black 
Lung compensation program gives us fair warning that alter 
ing the workers' compensation system does not necessarily 
lead to unambiguous improvement.
The Nature of Uncertainty About 
Occupational Disease Causation
There are many problems involved in occupational disease 
compensation, including the artificial legal barriers to com 
pensation and the apparent widespread ignorance of workers 
and their spouses about the workers' compensation remedy 
for occupational diseases. In these comments, however, I 
would like to focus on one type of problem, the uncertainty 
surrounding occupational illness compensation.
There are several types of uncertainty which affect the 
ability of workers' compensation to function effectively. 
Uncertainty about the agent that caused the worker's illness 
appears to be the primary distinguishing factor. Uncertainty 
about workplace exposures that occurred many years ago 
creates additional problems. Some common characteristics 
of occupational disease that contribute to this problem are:
1. The signs and symptoms of a chronic occupational 
disease are usually not related to a unique occupational ex 
posure. Medical and epidemiological knowledge may be in 
sufficient to distinguish a disease of occupational origin 
from one caused by nonoccupational exposures.
2. A disease can have several causes, both occupational 
and nonoccupational. A worker who smokes and has been 
exposed to ionizing radiation at work may develop lung
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cancer. Since both cigarette smoke and ionizing radiation are 
risk factors for lung cancer, neither can be considered the 
unique cause. Moreover, it may not be possible to determine 
the contribution of each exposure to the risk of developing 
the disease.
3. Even where there is scientific evidence about disease 
causation, the evidence will be presented in an adversarial 
setting, and there is no guarantee about how that evidence 
will be interpreted at hearing, or that all cases with the same 
factual base will receive consistent decisions.
4. The disease may develop years after exposure began, or 
even after exposure ceased. Because of this, records 
establishing employment and exposure may be difficult or 
impossible to obtain, and memories of events and exposures 
may be unclear.
5. Records of exposures to occupational hazards may 
never have existed. Only in recent years, with the promulga 
tion by the federal government of health regulations, have 
exposure data been collected regularly for health hazards 
other than ionizing radiation.
Only rarely can a physician diagnose a disease as definitely 
arising out of and in the course of employment. These excep 
tions occur when the disease has a unique causative agent to 
which there is a documented occupational exposure. Unfor 
tunately, few occupational diseases fall into this category. 
Mesothelioma is apparently one that does, but lung cancer 
and other lung diseases, hearing loss, low back pain, etc. 
may be caused by both occupational and nonoccupational 
factors. It is often difficult or impossible to determine which 
of these factors caused the disease in a specific case, or even 
to determine their relative contribution. This is not caused 
only by the inexactness of the few available epidemiological 
studies of occupational disease. Even when epidemiological 
studies are able to accurately determine excess risks of
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disease in populations, they are not able to determine which 
individuals in those populations would not have developed 
the disease without occupational exposure. In many cases, 
this uncertainty cannot be resolved.
The Impact of Uncertainty on the 
Administration of Occupational Disease Claims
Because it is necessary to demonstrate that an injury or ill 
ness occurred "out of and in the course of employment," 
uncertainty about the etiology of certain diseases implies 
uncertainty about whether those diseases are compensable. 
This uncertainty will often mean that a claim, if filed, will be 
controverted. This controversion, with ensuing delays and 
expenses, is the proximate cause of the symptoms of a poorly 
functioning system, namely, long delays and high legal and 
administrative costs.
Suppose that out of a group of 1000 workers it was known 
that 30 would eventually develop stomach cancer, but that, 
because of occupational exposures, 65 workers actually 
developed cancers. It is not possible to determine clinically 
which of the workers would have developed the cancer in the 
absence of occupational exposure. There are a number of 
toxicological and epidemiological studies that indicate that a 
substance is a carcinogen, but estimates of its potency vary. 
In addition, exposure records are not available on the 
workers. Reasonable and informed workers with stomach 
cancer will attempt to collect workers' compensation, and 
reasonable and informed insurers will controvert their 
claims. The probable outcome is that settlements will be 
reached for substantially less than would have been paid if 
the workers won, but much more than they would have 
received if they lost. The process of negotiation may take 
over a year and cost both claimants and insurers a great deal 
in legal expenses. Neither side will be completely satisfied, 
but both will prefer settlement to the uncertainty of a hear 
ing.
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A profit-maximizing insurer or self-insured employer will 
controvert a claim when the expected gain from controver- 
sion is greater than the legal and administrative costs. As the 
probability of winning at hearing increases, and as the value 
of the claim increases, the advantage to the insurer of con- 
troversion grows. For occupational injuries, there is general 
ly nothing to be gained from controversion. 3 For occupa 
tional diseases, where uncertainty is high and disabilities are 
often permanent and severe, the stakes are high. An insurer 
would be poorly serving its shareholders and customers if it 
did not controvert many of the cases brought.
Proposed Legislative Remedies
The extensive controversion of occupational disease 
claims makes it impossible for workers' compensation 
systems to meet the goals enumerated above, or to follow 
Elisburg's excellent prescription: "I suggest that the 
system ... be designed to keep adjudication to a minimum 
and to focus on eliminating the adversary mentality."
Elisburg suggests two types of legislated changes in the ad 
ministration of workers' compensation designed to reduce 
adjudication by eliminating the legal uncertainty about 
whether diseases are occupational in origin. These changes 
are: (1) the promulgation of legal presumptions and 
(2) establishing expert, impartial medical boards to deter 
mine the cause of, and to evaluate the degree of impairment 
due to, the claimant's illness. Spatz also suggests the use of 
presumptions. He suggests rebuttable presumptions that 
consider the claimant's burden to be met when "statistical 
evidence shows a higher incidence of a disease among groups 
of workers exposed to specific substances." 4
Occupational Disease Presumptions
Workers' compensation presumptions can specify a set of 
conditions that determine when the burden of persuasion is
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shifted from the claimant to the defendant. Experience with 
presumptions is not limited to the federal Black Lung pro 
gram. A number of state workers' compensation systems 
have presumptions linking exposure to hazardous substances 
and illness, linking job and exposure, and even linking job 
and illness. 5 New York law (Section 47) provides that any ex 
posure to harmful dust for a period of 60 days or longer is 
presumed to be harmful in the absence of substantial 
evidence to the contrary. Thus, a worker with lung disease 
who was exposed to silica dust for longer than 60 days would 
be presumed to have silicosis, unless the insurance carrier or 
employer could demonstrate otherwise. Kentucky has a 
similar presumption, which states (Section 342.316(5)) that 
for a worker with pneumoconiosis and employment ex 
posure for 10 years or more to an industrial hazard that is a 
cause of pneumoconiosis there is a rebuttable presumption 
that the disability or death is compensable. In several states, 
including New York, employees in specified jobs are presum 
ed to be exposed to hazards associated with those occupa 
tions, even if there is no evidence to support this assertion. In 
New York, any workers who develop anthrax while working 
with, or immediately after handling, wool, hair, bristles, 
hides, or skins, are presumed to have anthrax caused by their 
work.
The assumption of the papers by Spatz and Elisburg is that 
presumptions are favorable to the claimant. This may not be 
the case. Twenty states have negative presumptions for some 
diseases. The typical negative presumption states that there 
must be minimum exposure to the relevant hazard for com 
pensation to be paid. About half of these negative presump 
tions are rebuttable, while in 10 states there is no opportunity 
for workers with less than the mandated exposure to receive 
compensation.
Presumptions, whether stringent or liberal, should reduce 
uncertainty. For claimants who meet the criteria of the
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presumption, more cases may be brought, since the 
presumption will serve to educate workers and attorneys 
about the possibility of successful claims. In addition, the 
rate of controversion for these claims will be lower, since the 
probability of the claimant's winning at hearing would be 
quite high. As a result, claims should be paid more rapidly 
than now, and there should be lower legal costs. Where there 
are settlements, the amounts will probably be higher. The ex 
istence of presumptive criteria may also serve to discourage 
prospective claimants who do not qualify, even if there is no 
explicit negative presumption. The criteria would reflect 
legislative policy in workers' compensation, and are likely to 
influence decisions even in cases to which they do not direct 
ly apply.
A presumption may be relatively generous to claimants, or 
quite restrictive. And herein lies the problem. Any presump 
tion is likely to include in its scope workers without occupa 
tional disease, and is likely as well to exclude workers with 
occupational disease. Occupational disease experts can 
evaluate and summarize knowledge about the relationship 
between occupation, exposure, and disease, but they cannot 
decide on the basis of their scientific expertise whether to 
compensate fewer occupational disease victims in order to 
compensate fewer "undeserving" claimants.
The fact that such political decisions must be made does 
not, however, mean that future occupational disease 
presumptions will suffer from the same problems as the 
Black Lung program. Apparently, states with occupational 
disease presumptions have not experienced an explosion of 
successful claims as a result. Given current knowledge, one 
can only speculate on what would happen. While the concern 
of employers and insurers is understandable, most statisti 
cians would be hard pressed to make predictions on the basis 
of a single observation.
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Existing presumptions in state programs have not ap 
peared to dramatically reduce litigation and substantially in 
crease compensation of occupational disease claimants. The 
Black Lung program appears not to have distinguished ade 
quately between occupational and nonoccupational disease. 
If any conclusion is supportable from these sparse observa 
tions, it is that the drafting and administration of presump 
tions is very important, and that their mere existence means 
little. The politics of legislation and of implementation are 
critical.
Medical Boards
The same may be said for medical boards. While the prin 
ciple of impartial, expert evaluation appears to be a good 
one, achieving that goal may not be easy. In the highly con 
tentious climate surrounding occupational disease compen 
sation, expert medical boards have several drawbacks not 
shared by presumptions. First, they do not provide clear and 
objective guidelines to claimants and defendants prior to the 
decisions about filing and controversion. In addition, deci 
sions over time and by different medical boards may not be 
consistent. On the other hand, consistent decisionmaking 
over time by medical boards may help to narrow the range of 
dispute and thus reduce the costs of resolving occupational 
disease claims.
A Bolder Approach
The development of workers' compensation early in the 
twentieth century created administrative systems where legal 
systems had previously existed. Certainty increased for 
employers and workers; transaction costs declined. While 
coverage of all workers and adequate benefit levels have re 
mained important issues in the compensation of workplace 
injuries, the system has clear advantages for all parties over 
the tort system.
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This argument is more difficult to make for occupational 
diseases. While workers' compensation handles over 90 per 
cent of injury cases administratively, with resultant certain 
ty, speedy payment and efficient delivery of benefits, well 
over half of chronic occupational disease cases are con 
troverted. Proposed reforms are uncertain in effect and ar 
bitrary in nature.
Perhaps it is time to accept this fact and consider reforms 
in occupational disease compensation that focus on the most 
seriously disabling and fatal diseases, creating an ad 
ministrative system that reduces or eliminates the require 
ment of demonstrating specific workplace causation. Such 
an approach would be more like mandatory first-party 
disability and medical insurance than workers' compensa 
tion. As long as such a program were carefully phased-in, 
with appropriate general funds, similar to second-injury 
funds to handle pre-existing disease, it could greatly reduce 
uncertainty and get payment quickly and efficiently to peo 
ple who need them. An excellent argument for a mandatory 
first-party insurance scheme for occupational diseases has 
already been put forth by Peter Earth. 6 Earth proposes such 
a program, but limits it only to deaths from cancer. While 
this is a reasonable place to start, it is not apparent why the 
same arguments for covering deaths caused by cancer should 
not apply as well to cancer-induced disabilities, and to deaths 
and major disabilities from other chronic illnesses with oc 
cupational causes.
Removing these diseases from workers' compensation 
coverage would eliminate uncertainty to workers, employers, 
and insurers caused by the difficulty of determining work- 
relatedness. Administrative and legal expenses would be 
lower than the current system, although at the cost of com 
pensating workers with nonoccupational diseases. On the 
other hand, such a program has several potential drawbacks.
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First, it may be very costly, if not constrained to a limited 
number of chronic diseases and only to deaths and major 
disabilities. Second, to the extent that there are incentives to 
reduce workplace hazards in current workers' compensation 
for chronic occupational diseases, such incentives would be 
reduced or eliminated.
The incentive effect would be small, in my opinion, since 
incentives for prevention appear ineffective under the cur 
rent system of occupational disease compensation. The first 
problem is potentially the more serious. In some sense, the 
Black Lung program provided coverage for total disability 
and death from respiratory disease similar to the plan 
discussed in this section, but was more narrow in coverage of 
diseases and populations. This fact alone serves as adequate 
warning of the dangers of a plan that reduces or eliminates 
the necessity of demonstrating work-relatedness. As in the 
case of other reforms, the precise structure of the program, 
its implementation and its administration, would determine 
whether its costs were limited and its benefits targeted in a 
manner acceptable to workers, employers, and insurers. The 
political process would once again play a critical role.
Concluding Comments
The apparent unfairness and inefficiency of workers' com 
pensation of occupational diseases arises in great measure 
from the inherent uncertainty about whether many chronic 
diseases are work-related. Changes in workers' compensa 
tion that attempt to cope with this uncertainty must, by their 
nature, be arbitrary. In creating legal certainty from essential 
scientific and factual uncertainty, violence must be done to 
both the science and the facts. Some reforms, like presump 
tions, have the potential to increase efficiency and fairness. 
However, the implementation of reforms occurs in the 
political arena, and experience with the Black Lung program
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has left many observers with grave doubts about whether the 
political process can devise any reforms that adequately ad 
dress the goals described in the first section of this paper.
There may be no satisfactory resolution to the problems of 
compensating occupational disease within the traditional 
workers' compensation framework. Since the limitations of 
the work-relatedness criterion are so great, more serious at 
tention should be paid to reforms that attempt to remove oc 
cupational disease compensation from the workers' compen 
sation umbrella. Such a move would be in the spirit of the 
change from the tort system to workers' compensation. At 
first, many employers objected to the idea of automatic 
payments to injured workers when the employer was 
blameless. Others were probably concerned about the costs 
of compensating all workplace injuries, regardless of fault. 
Yet the change from the tort system to workers' compensa 
tion is, I believe, a positive one. Similarly, research and ex 
perience may validate the utility of an analogous step for 
compensating occupational diseases.
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